Only executive agreements are international agreements concluded by the President without reference to contractual or legal powers, i.e. only on the basis of the president`s constitutional powers as director general and commander-in-chief, in charge of U.S. foreign relations and military affairs. The archives of the Department of Foreign Affairs show that there is only a small percentage of such executive agreements and that the vast majority of them deal primarily with routine diplomatic and military affairs. Therefore, with relatively modest exceptions (such as agreements regulating citizens` property rights and personal injury against foreign governments), they have had little direct impact on private interests and have, therefore, resulted in low domestic litigation. However, for fear that the President would do, through international agreements, what would be unconstitutional, as was indeed the case in missouri v. Holland (1920), such agreements were not without controversy. Two themes, in particular, continue to begin. 36 The approved Restoration (fourth) project is remarkably silent on the issue of interchangeability, but there is no evidence that this silence supports those who argue against interchangeability. The authors of the Restatement (fourth) make it clear that they focus only on The Article II treaties and that they are not recipients of other international agreements. See Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, p. 113, note 8 of journalists (March 20, 2017).
So far, there seems to be little sign of change in the scientific debate. See z.B. Bradley, Curtis A., Exiting Congressional-Executive Agreements, 67 Duke L.J. 1615 (2018) (contracts and executive agreements of Congress are considered largely interchangeable even after the adoption of the Restoration (fourth) project. While the contracts and agreements between Congress and the executive branch do not differ qualitatively, it seems difficult to rationalize the reasons why negotiators sometimes show such an interest in choosing the instrument. As a result, some scholars seem to criticize the alleged lack of usefulness of contracts. Arguments come in different forms; Some believe that the use of the treaty by a president would show a particularly high degree of commitment, and the other note 15, that the struggle for Senate approval could encourage the government to disclose valuable information truthfully, footnote 16 or that the greater stability of Senate preferences helps to ensure long-term compliance. Footnote 17 All of these reports have in common the assumption that treaties, while politically more costly than the executive agreements of Congress, provide certain benefits to parties and thus justify their sustainability as a valuable political instrument of the United States. In Table 5, the same model specifications are executed with the competing complementary protocol protocol. Again, the results consistently show that treaty agreements are those that are concluded in the form of executive agreements.